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Abstract: In responding to Joshua Farris’ The Soul of Theological Anthropology, I suggest 
several reasons for questioning the theological need for substance dualism in any form. 
Specifically, I argue that it is not at the level of analytic argumentation that the mind or 
soul is best understood, and that the sciences do indeed challenge substance dualism 
(despite philosophical arguments to the contrary). In making this argument, I examine 
the roles of intuition and theological pre-commitments in one’s determination of the 
correct understanding of the mind or soul. I suggest that dualism is not only theolog-
ically unnecessary, but also an intuition that we have reason to question.
Keywords: physicalism; intuition; mind; soul; body; dualism.
Introduction
In offering a response to Joshua Farris’ The Soul of Theological Anthropology, 
it is perhaps useful to clearly state this response’s underlying assumptions 
and aims. Namely, I do not intend to argue against the finer points of Farris’ 
Wait, But Why? Challenging the Intuitive Force of Sub-
stance Dualism
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argument, but rather to question the intuitions and presuppositions on which 
the argument is based. Indirectly, then, this means that it is only fair to ac-
knowledge that the current response does not engage The Soul of Theological 
Anthropology in the manner which the author would have likely intended. 
Farris’ book offers a sustained argument for a very specific, detailed form 
of substance dualism, but does not purport to address interlocuters whose 
intuitions and theological frameworks do not commit them to any form of 
dualism whatsoever. To not acknowledge this would be disingenuous and 
unhelpful; it is all too common for academics to purportedly debate a topic 
using the same words and concepts, all the while missing an opportunity to 
name, own, and discuss the real commitments and dispositions underlying 
the more obvious technical disagreements. In what follows, then, I will not 
engage Farris’ sophisticated and intricate argument on the merits of its finer 
points. Rather, the intention is to name and question the role and persua-
sive thrust of intuition in one’s understanding of mind (particularly given 
scientific insights on the role of intuition and the seemingly self-evident), 
to hint at the theological pre-commitments that feed into the felt need for 
substance dualism in the first place, and to suggest (contra many a dualist!) 
that consciousness does, indeed, fall within the explanatory purview of 
empirical scientific inquiry. 
I.
At this point, it is right to point out that it is the strength and clarity of 
Farris’ book that allow one to locate real sources of disagreement. In debates 
about the mind-body relationship – and particularly in the field of science 
and theology – there is an awful lot of ‘bet hedging’ that occurs. Let us 
suppose that on one end of the spectrum we have Farris’ specific version of 
Cartesian substance dualism, what he calls person-body substance dualism 
(PBSD). Nearer the other end of the contemporary mind-body spectrum, we 
have some form of anti-reductionist physicalism, broadly defined. In order 
to avoid the negative connotations associated with physicalism, let us call 
this position ‘integrated physicality,’ and characterise it by the admittedly 
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broad affirmation that the human mind or soul just is what it is to be the 
unimaginably complex system of systems that involves a functioning brain 
in a sufficiently healthy human body, situated within an immensely complex 
physical, social, and linguistic environment. (Note that I intentionally 
avoid advocating any specific and particular position on the ontology of 
consciousness. Doing so would distract from the main thrust of this response, 
which, as stated, seeks to address intuition and pre-commitments, rather 
than the fine-grained detail of either Farris’ argument or my own.) To be 
a human body, with all the physical, psychological, cultural, and linguistic 
aspects that are inherently involved in the formation of that organism, is 
constitutive of personhood. 
If these two positions are relatively near the respective ends of the theo-
logical anthropological spectrum, then most theologians exist somewhere 
in the middle. There is a strong, perhaps begrudging, awareness that at the 
very least, the human body (particularly the brain) is in some way related to 
the mind or soul. Even staunch substance dualists such as Richard Swinburne 
would agree that “fairly obviously most conscious events are caused by brain 
events which are often themselves caused by physical events in or around 
the person’s body” (Swinburne 2013, 100). And yet, there is an even stronger 
intuition and conviction that the human body cannot be the whole story 
of mind, soul, or personhood. Or to put it even more strongly, “There is 
considerable diversity in how we think about the soul and its destiny, but 
that we have souls, spiritual or non-material parts of us that are distinct from 
our bodies and capable of surviving the death of our bodies, is a perennial 
and widespread human conviction” (Crisp, Porter, and Ten Elshof 2016, 
1). The result of these duelling intuitions and observations is a myriad of 
positions such as Philip Clayton’s strong emergence (Clayton 2004), Nancey 
Murphy’s nonreductive physicalism (Murphy and Brown 2007), and even 
William Hasker’s emergent dualism (Hasker 2018), positions which all seek 
to have the proverbial cake and eat it too: “My body is very important for 
my existence, in some way, but we must always insist upon that mysterious 
‘something more’ that is inexplicable in scientific terms and transcends 
physical mechanisms.” Some such positions fall under the umbrella of 
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‘property dualism,’ while Oliver Crisp labels some positions stemming from 
this motivation as “refined substance dualisms”: views that “try to make 
the case that traditional ways of thinking about humans that are substance 
dualist in nature need some significant revision in light of contemporary 
work in neuroscience and philosophy of mind” (Farris 2017, xiv). 
Because of this ubiquitous tendency to equivocate, some may find it 
refreshing to encounter a book such as Farris’ in which the author so clearly 
takes a position that lies just outside the circle of mainstream theological 
discussion. It is dishearteningly rare to find a scholar with the dispositional 
inclination to say: “No, do not attempt to soften my position into one of 
those dualism-lite alternatives. I really mean to say that I am a substance 
dualist, and persons are strictly identical to immaterial souls. I know this 
position cuts against the mainstream of academic theology, but so be it, for 
it is the position that most closely aligns with Scripture, Christian tradition, 
and lived experience, and it is also philosophically defensible.” Thus, one 
might appreciate Farris’ work for its stark and uncompromising exposition 
of Cartesian substance dualism. 
Of course, Farris’ book is notable for more than the author’s willing-
ness to take a stand on a somewhat unpopular position. His treatment of 
substance dualism is handled with an impressive level of rigor, and Farris 
exemplifies the best that the methods of analytic theology have to offer: 
precision, clarity, and a high degree of nuance in the explication of defi-
nitions, assumptions, and implications of the many varieties of substance 
dualism. Farris is not content to discuss a generic version of substance 
dualism, but spends a good portion of the book carefully drawing distinctions 
between difference forms of dualism, comparing their respective advantages 
and disadvantages for a biblically-informed Christian theology, and only 
then spelling out the intricate details of his own ‘emergent creationism.’ 
If William Abraham is correct that analytic theology is “the articulation of 
the central themes of Christian teaching illuminated by the best insights 
of analytic philosophy,” then surely Farris’ defence of substance dualism 
is an exemplary application of this method as applied toward theological 
ends (Crisp and Rea 2009, 54). 
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Of particular value is Farris’ recognition that there is something about 
human embodiment that is important. In his emergent creationism, ‘souls are 
created by God but souls only come into existence in conjunction with their 
bodies in time as emergent souls or as a distinct emergent nature; where 
bodies, having their own properties/powers, become causally necessary for 
souls and vice versa’(Farris 2017, 76). Hence this is a version of substance 
dualism that recognizes the importance of physical bodies, insisting that 
a human soul – a human person – is not created until there is a physical body 
able to receive that soul: the soul “has an integrated and holistic relationship 
to the body and the kind-nature of the soul is explanatorily made sense of 
in terms of the soul’s coming into existence via its structural relationship 
to the body” (Farris 2017, 76). While bearing strong resemblance to Hasker’s 
emergent dualism, then, emergent creationism interestingly both affirms 
the direct creation of the soul by God (contra Hasker), while still affirming 
that the body is important for one’s anthropology. The explication of this 
position is handled well, and if one is committed to preserving a strong 
substance dualism using the tools of analytic theology, Farris’ argument 
may well be the one to beat. 
II.
However, this brings me to the inescapable question: “Wait, but why?” Given 
that so many Christian theologians (eg., Philip Clayton [2004], Veli-Matti 
Kärkkäinen [2016]), philosophers (eg., Kevin Corcoran [2006], Peter van 
Inwagen [1995]), Nancey Murphy [Murphy and Brown 2007]), and biblical 
scholars (eg., Joel Green [2015], Mark Harris [2014], NT Wright [2013]) have 
considered substance dualism to be theologically unnecessary, why would 
one insist upon a position that seems at odds with much of contemporary 
science (notwithstanding the usual objections that the mind or soul is not 
the sort of thing that could ever be addressed by the sciences in the first 
place)? Is substance dualism in any form really a theological necessity? And 
perhaps more importantly, why are Christian theologians so divided on their 
intuitive responses to that question? Of course, theological anthropology 
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has been well-handled by all manner of interested parties, and it is not my 
intention to rehearse detailed arguments against dualism from Biblical 
studies, systematic theology, philosophy, cognitive science of religion, or 
the various brain sciences. What is worth reiterating (and this is nothing 
new) is that one’s background commitments make all the difference when 
addressing the question of mind, soul, and body: commitments involving 
hermeneutical lenses and Scriptural interpretation, implicit metaphysical 
models of the God-creation relationship, relationship between physical 
matter and God, etc. In addition to such conscious and explicit background 
commitments is the more subtle (but perhaps more powerful) role of 
intuition: that visceral sense of what is or can be true, and which plays 
a not-insignificant role in adjudicating which explanations (philosophically, 
theologically, and even scientifically) we deem to be persuasive. Peter van 
Inwagen describes this nicely, writing that intuitions may be, “in some cases, 
the tendencies that make certain beliefs attractive to us, that ‘move’ us in 
the direction of accepting certain propositions without taking us all the way 
to acceptance” (van Inwagen 1997, 309). As persuasive as Farris’ PBSD might 
be, given certain commitments and intuitions, I suggest that it is precisely 
at the level of pre-commitments and intuitions that the real work needs to 
be done when it comes to questions of the mind or soul. 
What remains, then, is to highlight the role of the background commit-
ments predetermining which approaches to the mind or soul we are willing 
to take seriously, and to encourage suspicion of our collective intuition 
when it comes to the ontology of mind. Indeed, it is fairly clear that the real 
departure point between various readers occurs quite early in Farris’ book, 
where he writes: “Attending to my mental states, it becomes plain that I as 
a thing with mental states am just different from my body….strictly speaking 
I am not my body…I am distinct from my body, which seems to be basic upon 
reflection…I readily make an intuitive assumption that I am not identical to 
my body…I intuitively believe that I am not body” (Farris 2017, 19). In many 
ways, it is from this basic, felt sense of intuitive dualism that Farris’ entire 
argument proceeds. It is the motivation and foundation for everything that 
comes next, and as such, the argument for person-body substance dualism 
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is only as sound as one’s intuition in regards to the immateriality of mind. 
Given, then, that the natural sciences have proved remarkably effective at 
explaining so many of the cognitive and perceptual functions previously 
associated with an immaterial mind, and have also provided reasons to 
question the epistemological validity of brute intuition, it is thus at the 
level of pre-commitments and intuition that the real conversation needs 
to take place – rather than a sustained debate about the finer analytical 
points supporting the pre-determined conclusion that substance dualism 
is theologically necessary. 
Here it is useful to make a few brief remarks about theological pre-com-
mitments, and then set those aside in order to turn to intuition and the 
question of whether the mind is or is not a proper object of scientific inquiry. 
Oliver Crisp has written that analytic theology involves both procedural 
and substantive elements. On the procedural side, analytic theology is 
characterised by the methods and style of contemporary analytic philosophy; 
there are “certain assumptions about why this procedure and not some other 
currently on offer is better suited to the task of theologizing” (Crisp 2009, 
35). On the substantive side, analytic theology is marked by “several features 
that are interrelated: the presumption that there is some theological truth 
of the matter and that this truth of the matter can be ascertained and under-
stood by human beings (theologians included!), and an instrumental use of 
reason” (Crisp 2009, 35). What seems clear on a birds-eye view is that Farris’ 
PBSD is essentially a robust and persuasive analytic argument that deploys 
the “tools” of analytic philosophy in support of a pre-existing conviction 
that substance dualism is theologically necessary. It is not, I suggest, an 
exploration into whether or not substance dualism is actually theologically 
necessary. To be clear: the intention here is not to critique analytic theology 
as a whole. Rather, it is important to determine the right theological tools 
for the job at hand, and to be clear about the extent to which we are willing 
for those tools to lead us to surprising or unexpected conclusions (Perry and 
Ritchie 2018). I wholeheartedly agree that an “instrumental use of reason” 
is vital in discussions of the mind. The suggestion here is simply that 1) the 
argument at hand neglects many of the “right tools” (eg the sciences), and 
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2) that the correct use of reason must in this case engage with empirical 
inquiries into physical and psychological processes, including those that 
cast suspicion on the epistemological weight often attached to intuition. 
Indeed, these points have led a great many Christian scholars to reject 
substance dualism (as noted and cited above), arguably leading to even 
more robust theological, philosophical, and biblical scholarship. Farris’ 
PBSD is a very strong analytic argument, but the conclusion it is intended 
to support may well be indefensible when other tools and commitments 
are seriously entertained. 
III.
Leaving theological method and pre-commitments aside, we turn now to the 
complex question of intuition. It is highly significant that it is possible not 
only to question the reliability of one’s intuition that the mind is ultimately 
distinct from physical processes, but also to legitimise the question of 
consciousness as a proper scientific problem. Here a word about terminology 
becomes important. I follow Farris and most others in this discussion by us-
ing the words mind, consciousness, and soul interchangeably. Note, however, 
that this conflation of mind and soul has a very interesting history worth 
looking into, and that this conflation has put dualists on ever-shakier ground 
as the various brain sciences have made significant inroads into the study 
of mental experience and functioning (Malik 2001, 37). It has not always 
been the case that ‘soul’ has been equated with ‘consciousness’ as defined 
by philosophers of mind. For example, Thomistic hylomorphism would see 
what we call the ‘mind’ as being but one part of the soul/body whole, and 
would likely not equate soul with ‘subjective conscious experience’ in quite 
the same way as substance dualists (Adams 2016). Observers of dualistic 
arguments might well find it puzzling that even the most prominent advo-
cates substance dualism so willingly conflate soul with mind. 
Of course, what most dualists mean by the soul or immaterial mind is 
just that seemingly nonphysical phenomenon of first-person, subjective 
experience. There is just something it is like to be me, and this “something” 
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seems intuitively and obviously distinct from whatever neurobiological 
descriptions might be used to describe my neural activity (Nagel 1974). David 
Chalmers’ classic “hard problem of consciousness” captures the spirit of 
this intuitive dualism well: “An organism is conscious if there is something 
it is like to be that organism,” and we have no good reason to think that 
scientific descriptions of neural processes could ever render a satisfactory 
explanation for this reality (Chalmers 1997, 11). Or as Philip Clayton puts 
it, subjective conscious experience “does not seem to be the kind of thing 
that could be explained in terms of functions or structures” (Clayton 2006, 
133). Chalmers, of course, divides consciousness into this hard problem of 
subjective experience on one hand, and the so-called “easy problems” of 
consciousness on the other: attention, behaviour control, access to mental 
states, reportability, information integration, and the ability to react to the 
environment (Chalmers 1997, 9). Many dualists are happy to acknowledge 
that the brain sciences can fully explain these functional capacities, but 
will still insist that intuition – presumably assumed to be a universal or 
near-universal intuition – commits them to the affirmation that “to account 
for conscious experience, we need an extra ingredient in the explanation” 
(Chalmers 1997, 17). But do we? 
Of course, there is the well-rehearsed critique that the mind-body “prob-
lem” is almost always framed in a philosophically-flawed question-begging 
manner in which the mind is presupposed from the outset to be distinct from 
the body. Arguments against a physicalist understanding of consciousness 
almost always presuppose the very thing that the physicalist would object 
to: the immaterial, perhaps super- or supra-natural nature of subjective 
experience. As Patricia Churchland argues, “the trouble with the ‘Hard 
Problem’ characterization is that on the strength of a proprietary definition, 
it rejects [potential scientific explanations] as wrong” (Churchland 1997, 
38–39). Dualists generally define consciousness as “subjective experience 
which is necessarily immune to scientific analysis,” thereby defining the 
problem in a proprietary manner that constrains the conversation from 
the outset. Leaving this aside, though, it is certainly apparent that debates 
about mind almost always come down to what Chalmers himself has called 
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a “brute clash of intuitions…Explicit argument can help us to isolate and 
characterize the clash, but not to resolve it” (Chalmers 1996, 167). For many, 
mind intuitively seems qualitatively different from atoms and molecules, 
leading them to appeal to what Richard Swinburne calls “the apparent obvi-
ousness of ‘matter cannot produce thought;’” philosophical arguments are 
thus constructed using the nonphysicality of the mind as a sort of brute fact, 
a starting point in one’s theological anthropology (Swinburne 2004, 193). 
But what happens when the “Hard Problem” does not seem all that 
hard? Indeed, many in philosophy of mind and the various brain sciences 
flatly reject the way the mind-body problem is framed, and the intuitive 
foundation on which it is based (Dennett 2015). As Patricia Churchland 
argues, “Whether we can or cannot imagine a phenomenon being explained 
in a certain way is a psychological fact about us, not an objective fact about 
the nature of the phenomenon itself” (Churchland 1997, 42). My inability to 
imagine a satisfying physical explanation of what we are calling the mind 
or soul is simply not a good indication of reality. The history of science is 
riddled with examples of seemingly mysterious or supernatural phenomena 
being progressively explicated in scientific terms; or as Charles Coulson 
once quipped, “There is no ‘God of the gaps’ to take over at those strategic 
places where science fails; and the reason is that gaps of this sort have the 
unpreventable habit of shrinking” (Coulson 1955, 20). Moreover, it is worth 
noting that even the most hard-core physicalists do not expect their expla-
nations to feel intuitively satisfying for those whose dualism is grounded in 
the apparently self-evident distinction between body and mind. As Valerie 
Gray Hardcastle writes, “scientific theories of consciousness won’t explain 
the weirdness of consciousness to those who find the identify [of the mind 
and brain] weird” (Hardcastle 1997, 63). Indeed, given our first-person 
perspective, complete lack of objective distance from the subject matter 
under discussion, and the limited abilities of the particular brains that we 
have, why should we even expect a scientific explanation of consciousness 
to overcome our intuitive dualism (McGinn 1989)? 
The problematic role of intuition in philosophical thinking has long 
been acknowledged.: as Alfred Ayer wrote, “unless it is possible to provide 
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some criterion by which one may decide between conflicting intuitions, 
a mere appeal to intuition is worthless as a test of aproposition’s validity” 
(Ayer 1936, 106). Moreover, the appropriate role of intuition in cognition 
more broadly is hotly contested (Kiel 2010, Shtulman and Schulz 2008). The 
trustworthiness of intuition is by no means established as certain within any 
discipline or on any task: the sheer volume and breadth of the research on 
cognitive biases should give us pause before placing too much weight on any 
thought or belief that seems self-evidently true. Indeed, “where biases exists, 
individuals draw inferences or adopt beliefs where the evidence for doing 
so in a logically sound manner is either insufficient or absent” (Haselton, 
Nettle, & Andrews 2015, 725). This is not to say that intuition is not valuable 
(it is), and there is certainly a great deal of research left to be done on how 
intuition has evolved and how it functions in different phenomenological 
experiences and intentional cognitive tasks. But to rely on intuition is 
anything but a safe bet in philosophy and theology, particularly when (as 
in the case of the mind) there is actually a great deal of scientific reason to 
question a particular intuition. The challenge to intuitive dualism becomes 
even starker when we realize that there exist “theories of error” about why 
we would mistakenly form intuitive beliefs about dualism in the first place. 
That is, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and the brain sciences 
more broadly can produce explanatory models that describe how and why 
we naturally form erroneous intuitions about the self (Schwitzgebel and 
Gordon 2000, Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman 2002). 
If, for the moment, we can lay aside intuition, the question then arises: 
Why would we feel the need to posit extra bits of metaphysical furniture 
in our theological anthropology, when every indication from the sciences 
suggests the through-and-through physicality of all those specific functions 
and features of the human mind that, in sum, seem not to require that 
“extra ingredient” of an immaterial soul? Does Christian theology require 
substance dualism? I and many others have written elsewhere about the 
richly textured metaphysical picture that various Christian traditions have 
to offer to this conversation, broadly challenging the assumption that 
physicality necessarily stands in ontological contrast to the spiritual. I will 
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thus not rehearse those arguments here, but merely suggest that there are 
indeed “theological frameworks that remove the need for defensiveness 
or theological anxiety in the face of scientific, physicalist explanations 
of the mind…Not only is the mind not nonphysical but also theologically 
speaking it does not need to be more than physical” (Ritchie 2019, 350). 
This is because “physicality does not stand in dichotomous relationship to 
God. A complex physical picture of the mind need pose no threat to dynamic 
interaction with God – if indeed it is true that ‘in him we live and move and 
have our being’” (Ritchie 2019, 350). In other words, if one’s understanding 
of the God-nature relationship is such that physicality itself is recognised 
as being always and already involved with God, then carving out the mind 
as immaterial seems far less necessary.
Space would not permit a full discussion of the great many theologians, 
biblical scholars, and Christian philosophers who have identified textual, 
theological, and philosophical reasons to challenge dualism and adopt one or 
another monistic approach to the human person. As just one example, note 
that many biblical scholars would agree with Joel Green that “an anthropol-
ogy that that posits an ontologically distinct soul…is not only unnecessary 
but actually stands in tension with key aspects of the resurrection message 
of the Scriptures” (Green 2004, 86). Perhaps here it is most constructive 
simply to point out that alternatives to dualism – even physicalism – need 
not be caricatured in the flatly reductionist way in which dualists usually 
portray them. To the extent that dualism is driven by fears that the human 
person will be explained away as being “nothing but a pack of neurons,” 
the breadth and nuance of non-dualistic positions should be recognised 
(Crick 1994, 3). One can affirm a sort of expansive physicalism and agree 
with Willem Drees that reductionism is inappropriate: “the description and 
explanation of phenomena may require concepts which do not belong to the 
vocabulary of fundamental physics, especially if such phenomena involve 
complex arrangements of constituent particles or extensive interactions with 
a specific environment” (Drees 1996, 12). Recognising human physicality 
need not be seen as a materialist attempt at removing God from the causal 
and explanatory picture of reality. 
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Conclusion
Thin descriptions of physicalism are just as unhelpful as the confused and 
caricatured portrayals of substance dualism that Farris so ably surpasses. 
Indeed, the emerging physical picture of the human being is one that is – 
quite literally – unimaginably complex, a picture including not just brain 
tissue, but systems of systems involving increasingly intricate biological 
processes, which themselves produce emergent features which cannot be 
described in reductionistic fashion. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that the comfortable old categorical boxes we use in our ontological 
descriptions are problematic; it is inappropriate to try to cram the fuzzy, 
messy realities of biological systems into neatly defined and strictly bound-
aried ontological categories such as ‘soul and body’ or ‘mental substance 
and physical substance.’ Our mental lives are not only embodied, but involve 
processes and interactions outside the brain itself (Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch 1991, Clark and Chalmers 1998). An honest physicalism will never be 
a flatly reductionistic description of neural activity, but will always paint the 
most nuanced, dynamic, and richly coloured picture of the human person 
that is, I would suggest, even more theologically rich than that offered by 
substance dualism. By challenging intuition, non-defensively engaging with 
the wildly successful research projects produced by the various brain-re-
lated disciplines, and exploring theological models in which God is always 
involved with the physical world itself, substance dualism becomes not only 
theologically unnecessary – but incapable of doing justice to the full range 
of resources offered by Christian theology and history. 
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